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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005452

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STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,  
EUR/RPM  
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG  
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN  
OSD FOR KIMMIT  
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [MARR](#) [AF](#)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI WITH A/S BOUCHER ON SECURITY  
SITUATION, JIRGAS, AND SPRAYING

REF: A. SECSTATE 182909

[1](#)B. KABUL 5387

[1](#)C. KABUL 5394

[1](#)D. KABUL 5388

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

[1](#)1. (S) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher used his November 8 meeting with President Karzai to report on his discussions in Islamabad on the cross-border jirgas, and urged early direct discussions before differences on expectations and plans become set. Karzai agreed to begin the process, sought U.S. views on the role of the UN, and hoped for a January-February timeframe for the jirgas. Karzai sympathized with President Musharraf's position relating to Waziristan and welcomed further military strikes which would "please Afghans very much". The Afghan Government's position on Musa Qala, particularly that it was not a deal with the Taliban, is not clear to many Afghans. Karzai is becoming aware of the need to communicate better. Boucher explained ongoing U.S. efforts to obtain greater assistance for Afghanistan which could result in greater capacity to link military action to reconstruction, development and governance efforts. Karzai agreed to ground spraying in Helmand but insisted that security come first. End Summary.

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Need for Early Discussions on Cross-Border Jirgas  
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[1](#)2. (S) Afghan President Karzai used his November 9 meeting with Assistant Secretary Boucher to ask what he had heard in Islamabad regarding Pakistan's plans for the cross border jirgas. Boucher reviewed his November 7 discussion with President Musharraf, noting that Pakistan was still deciding what it wanted from the jirgas. It was considering concepts, the scope of the meeting, participants, and what decisions to make. Governor Orakzai is leading Pakistan's preparations, but his focus is on a border/tribal vision rather than a

national view and thus does not represent national scope. Boucher said the Pakistani side was still working this out and encouraged Karzai and his government to start working together with Pakistani counterparts to bridge differences in thinking before positions became set.

¶3. (S) Karzai agreed that the government needed to move forward more deliberately, and promised that "our group will contact the other side." Karzai informed Boucher that Pir Gilani, former Supreme Court judge Shinwari, and Parliamentary leader Mohaqqueq will lead a commission for policy guidance. Farouk Wardak would serve as the Secretary General and lead the Afghan Secretariat as the "best point man" on day-to-day work. Foreign Minister Spanta would continue preparations on a national basis.

¶4. (S) Boucher concurred that Karzai's basic goals for the jirgas (fighting terrorism and ensuring security) needed national support, but he encouraged the focus be on tribal leaders in order to build their authority. Karzai said he was happy to let the other side propose whatever it wanted from the Afghan side. Karzai's interest is in getting a broad representation of Pakistani moderates. He is confident the Pakistani business community and secular leaders would support Afghanistan's desire to confront the issue of terrorism. Karzai said he if he has enough of such people would he welcome "spoilers and radicals" being present at the jirgas, as he could then confront and "crush" them. Boucher suggested that Pak-Afghan consultations take place first before becoming fixed on the configuration. Karzai reiterated that the issues were larger than just tribal and asked if Pakistan was also focusing on the national perspective. Boucher responded that the Pakistan's focus was

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on the tribal areas.

¶5. (S) Assistant Secretary Boucher reminded Karzai that Secretary Rice had made clear that the U.S. was willing to

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help. He asked Karzai for his view of the role of the U.S. and UN in the jirgas. Karzai said he would take inspiration from the tripartite meeting in Washington where President Bush made clear that the U.S. would not be the judge but a participant. Without U.S. participation, Karzai stressed, there will be few expectations and Afghanistan will not be able to achieve what it wants. Karzai can accept a role for the UN but recognizes that the Pakistanis may not be happy about it. Boucher noted that the Government of Pakistan was somewhat mystified by the UN's role, including The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's delivery of a letter from Kabul on the jirgas. Karzai said no written text was given to the group to deliver (later confirmed by UN officials, they passed a "non-paper" of their understanding of then-current Afghan views). In response to Karzai's question about the proper role for the UN, A/S Boucher suggested that the UN facilitate but not be involved in shuttle diplomacy.

¶6. (S) Karzai asked if the Pakistanis had indicated to Boucher any timeframe for the jirgas. Boucher responded that no particular dates were proposed, but the period after Foreign Minister meetings in January or February seemed most likely. Karzai agreed.

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North Waziristan Agreement  
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¶7. (S) Turning to the North Waziristan Agreement, Boucher reported that while Musharraf understands that it has problems, he is not ready to call it a failure. Instead he is determined to make it effective. This includes taking serious military action, if necessary. Boucher had agreed with Musharraf's assessment, including that it is too early

to make a final judgement on its effectiveness.

¶8. (S) Karzai saw no let up in the killing on the Afghan side. He sympathized with Musharraf whom he sees as under increased pressure since the Washington meetings. Karzai made reference to the November 8 suicide bombing against Pakistani soldiers and the gathering of thousands of Pashtuns against Pakistan military operations against madrassas. Karzai hoped that Musharraf would carry out more military strikes as this would "please Afghans very much."

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Musa Qala  
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¶9. (S) The Ambassador raised the recent Musa Qala agreement between the local shura and Governor Daud in Helmand province, noting that it had stirred much discussion and strange speculation, including e.g., that Karzai was now negotiating with Hekmatayr. Boucher mentioned that he had heard repeated Afghan nervousness about what political arrangements were being considered. The Ambassador suggested that President Karzai consider issuing a statement before Parliament or on television/radio to explain what was happening in Musa Qala and to reiterate basic principles of government authority. The Ambassador said the truth was not getting around the country and there is a gap between the facts and what the public thinks is happening.

¶10. (S) Karzai agreed he needed to explain the situation, not just nationally, but to the areas around Musa Qala as well. Boucher said the basic message should be that the government was not conceding land or authority, but extending government authority to the area. Karzai added that it would

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be important to clarify there not been a deal made with the Taliban.

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Stepping Up U.S. Assistance  
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¶11. (C) Boucher briefed Karzai on ongoing efforts in Washington to obtain greater assistance for Afghanistan. He said that since the trilateral White House dinner in September, Washington had begun looking at Afghanistan assistance more strategically. The U.S. wanted to develop greater capacity to link military action to development/reconstruction and governance. If this could be done in a coordinated fashion, we could bring about greater success in Afghanistan, he explained. The U.S. saw enough spots where this could be done more generally across the board. Washington would be taking a look at numbers and projects and consulting on the latter with the Afghan government. Rather than an incremental shift, the U.S. plans to blanket certain areas, but would be rely on Karzai's leadership to extend good governance so that the Afghan people could benefit directly. Much of the effort would go into roads and electricity.

¶12. (C) Boucher said he was delivering the same message to the Europeans whom we were hoping would do more, particularly in the new EU Seven-Year budget, which is expected to have Euro 200 million for Afghanistan. The U.S. was also talking to Khazakstan and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, the U.S. would be looking for a strong recommitment from NATO at the Riga Summit. The U.S. was also working closely with the Germans, who will be taking over both the G-8 and EU presidencies, to make Afghanistan a centerpiece in both these fora.

Counter-Narcotics  
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¶13. (S) Boucher said that we needed to step up alternative

livelihood programs, eradication, and prosecutions. He noted that the issue of ground spraying had been discussed between Karzai and National Security Advisor Hadley (REF D). Karzai said that ground spraying would be tested in Helmand, as well as in Musa Qala. He said the situation was "troublesome" and stressed that "security must come first". Karzai expected more people from the area to join the Taliban in the short-term. Karzai wanted to test if Musa Qala would continue to be an area for poppy production and questioned if the Musa Qala was not motivated by a desire for a ceasefire to facilitate poppy cultivation this season.

¶14. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable.

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